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PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION: IMPACT OF
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(b) UPON
ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS OF
PRIOR ACCIDENT EVIDENCE
As early as 1810 American courts recognized the critical need for
logically relevant, similar fact evidence.' Similar fact evidence is evi-
dence of prior acts, happenings, transactions or claims that are similar
to the facts at issue in the present dispute.2 Currently, a split of author-
ity exists regarding the admissibility of such evidence in civil and crim-
inal cases. The exclusionary approach3 and the inclusionary approach4
to admissibility reflect this split.
1. See State v. Van Houten, 3 N.J.L. 248 (1810). This forgery case was the first principal
American case in which proof of the prior conduct of the accused was admitted to prove that he
knew the bill he was passing was a counterfeit. Evidence of the accused's prior acts created a
circumstantial inference that he passed the present counterfeit bill with the requisite knowledge
and intent:
[Justice Pennington] [w]as clearly of opinion that the whole of the conduct of the defend-
ant from the time he left Newark, the day before he passed the bill at Trenton, until he
was apprehended the same evening, was a proper subject of inquiry; not however to
prove the fact that he passed the bill, or that the bill itself was counterfeit, but the knowl-
edge that he had of its being counterfeit at the time of passing it; and the evil intent with
which he did it.
Id at 250 (footnote omitted).
See generalb' Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV.
988, 993-94 (1938).
2, See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 196-200 (E. Cleary 2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
3 The exclusionary approach to similar fact evidence, which strictly prohibits the introduc-
tion of any such evidence, is based upon the theory that courts should never admit such evidence
unless a strictly construed exception is triggered by the proffered evidence. As one commentator
stated.
As there was in England, so in America there is a pervading belief among judges and
text writers, which has scarcely been questioned since it arose about 1850, that in the
beginning the law said, "Let no similar facts be admitted", and no similar facts were
admitted. So great, runs the thought, was the solicitude of the common law to avoid
damning the accused with prejudice, diffusion, and confusion of issues that, however,
relevant and on whatever issue, similar facts and, above all, similar bad acts of the ac-
cused were never admitted.
Stone, supra note 1, at 989.
Exceptions developed to this general rule of exclusion, however, and the modem view, still
based upon the general preference of exclusion, admits prior act evidence where it conforms to
narrow exceptions. The United States Supreme Court in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967),
summarized the modem exclusionary view:
Because such evidence is generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice, it is
usually excluded except when it is particularly probative in showing such things as in-
tent, an element in the crime, identity, malice, a system of criminal activity, or when the
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The need for logically relevant, similar fact evidence is especially
great in product liability litigation.5 In product liability litigation simi-
lar fact evidence includes relevant proof of other accidents or injuries.
Plaintiffs in product liability actions offer such evidence as logically
relevant to establish similarity of circumstances with prior accidents.6
They often must rely solely on similar fact evidence to establish by
circumstantial inference the existence of the product's defect in the
hands of the manufacturer. Without this inference, a plaintiff is not
likely to successfully carry the heavy burden of proof, resulting in a
dismissal.7
defendant has raised the issue of his character, or when the defendant has testified and
the State seeks to impeach his credibility.
Id at 560-61 (citations omitted).
See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of this theoretical
approach.
4. The inclusionary approach to similar fact evidence is based upon the belief that all simi-
lar act evidence should be admitted if it is relevant to the case at bar. Slough & Knightly, Other
Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REv. 325 (1956), define the inclusionary approach:
In a minority of jurisdictions, the general theory of exclusion has been rejected in
favor of a more lenient theory of admission. This minority rule will admit evidence of
other crimes if it is relevant, unless its relevance is to show only a general disposition to
commit the crime in question. Such evidence is admissible not because it comes within
an exception to a rule of exclusion, but because the rule of exclusion is sufficiently nar-
row that it does not apply.
Id at 326-27 (footnote omitted).
See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of this theoretical
approach.
5. To state a claim in strict liability against a manufacturer, the plaintiffhas the burden of
proving that the product was defective and that the defect existed while the product was in the
manufacturer's possession. To successfully carry this burden, the plaintiff often needs to rely on
prior accident evidence to establish a circumstantial inference of such a manufacturer's defect.
See generally Barker, Circumstantial Evidence in Strict Liability Cases, 38 ALB. L. REv. 1t, 12-13
(1973); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tortfor Defective Products. The Road to and Past Vandermark
38 S. CAL. L. REv. 30, 47 (1965); Morris, Proof of Safety History in Negligence Cases, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 205, 225-28 (1948).
6. Plaintiffs offer similar fact evidence to establish the existence of a dangerous condition, a
causal link between the dangerous condition and the injury suffered, knowledge of the dangerous
condition by the defendant, or to rebut the defendant's claim of impossibility. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 2, § 200, at 473-76.
7. See, e.g., Halbrook v. Koehring Co., 75 Mich. App. 592, 255 N.W.2d 698 (1977). In
Halbrook, a crane operator sustained injuries when he attempted to lift an object heavier than the
maximum capacity of the crane. The plaintiff was unable to sustain his cause of action because
the trial court excluded evidence of product defects, the failure of mechanical locks, prior to the
accident.
See generally Langford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 513 F.2d 1121, 1124 (2d Cir. 1975) (elements
of plaintiffs burden of proof under strict products liability doctrine) (quoting Codling v. Paylia,
298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 470 (1973)).
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Courts generally exclude similar fact evidence because the probative
value of such evidence does not outweigh the dangers that generally
accompany its admission, such as jury misuse of the evidence., Courts
also refuse to admit such evidence for fear that issues collateral to the
dispute will dominate the litigation.9
Many courts, to minimize the dangers such evidence creates, have
imposed "similarity" requirements upon prior accident evidence in
product liability litigation.' ° Theoretically, if the prior accident oc-
curred under substantially similar circumstances as the accident at is-
sue, with nearly identical products, the probative value of the prior
accident evidence justifies its admission."I The various similarity tests
found in products liability litigation, however, lead to inconsistent deci-
sions regarding the admissibility of prior accident evidence.12 The most
serious consequence of this inconsistency is that courts often improp-
erly exclude logically relevant evidence. Similarity goes to the weight
of the evidence, not its admissibility.' 3 Some courts, however, relying
8. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Matherne, 348 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1965). The
Fifth Circuit explained:
The admission of such evidence is also subject to the reasonable discretion of the trial
court as to whether the defendant is taken by unfair surprise and as to whether the
prejudice or confusion of issues which may probably result from such admission is dis-
proportionate to the value of such evidence.
Id at 400 (footnote omitted). See also infra note 30 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Blackwell v. J.J. Newberry Co., 156 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941), in which
the court analyzed the effect of an admission of lack of prior accident evidence:
Not only would such evidence be unfair to plaintiff, but it would, by introducing numer-
ous collateral issues, produce such confusion into the trial of the case that the value to
the jury of whatever probative value it had would be far outweighed by the disadvan-
tages which would result from its introduction.
Id at 21. On this basis the court rejected the proffered evidence of a lack of prior accidents, which
the defendant offered to show that he was reasonably unaware of the "dangerous condition" in his
store which allegedly caused the plaintiff's injury.
See also Uitts v. General Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In Uitts, the court
rejected prior accident evidence because "[ilt can often result in unfair prejudice, consumption of
time and distraction of the jury to collateral matters." Id at 1383.
10. Similarity tests vary according to the purpose for which the evidence is offered. See infra
note 24 and accompanying text. In Freed v. Simon, 370 Mich. 473, 122 N.W.2d 813 (1963), the
Michigan Supreme Court held: "[T]he rule now seems to be established that evidence of prior
accidents at the same place and ansing from the same cause is admissible . . . subject to the
general requirements of similarity of conditions, reasonable proximity in time, and avoidance of
confusion of issues." Id at 475, 122 N.W.2d at 814-15. See also infra notes 28-30 and accompa-
nying text.
11. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 200, at 473-76.
12. See infra notes 24 & 33-43 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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on the exclusionary theory, automatically exclude prior accident evi-
dence if it does not meet one of the recognized exceptions to the general
rule of exclusion. t4
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. ti Rule
404(b) t6 governs the admissibility of similar fact evidence in federal
courts by providing that such evidence is admissible so long as it is not
offered to prove the "bad" character of the accused. It has failed, how-
ever, to resolve the conflict between the exclusionary and the inclusion-
ary approaches to such evidence.' 7 Courts have interpreted rule 404(b)
as codifying either view, with the anomalous result that the two incon-
sistent interpretations have survived the adoption of the rule. 8
Part One of this Note presents an historical overview of admissibility
of prior accident evidence in product liability litigation before the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This section also provides
14. Historically, exclusion of prior accident evidence rested in the discretion of the trial
judge. Judges utilized this discretion, however, within the confines of the exclusionary theory of
admissibility. McCormick states:
Proof of other similar accidents and injuries, offered for various purposes in negli-
gence and product liability cases, is another kind of evidence which may present for
consideration the counterpulls of the probative value of and need for the evidence on the
one hand, and on the other the danger of unfair prejudice, undue consumption of time,
and distraction of the jury's attention from the issues. A few courts. . . adopted a more
or less flexible rule of exclusion. Most courts, however, wisely confide in the trial judge's
discretion,. .. the responsibility for determining the balance of advantage and of admit-
ting or excluding the evidence. Even in these liberal jurisdictions, most trial judges will
scrutinize cautiously offers of evidence of other accidents. . . . The prospects for suc-
cess will be much affected by the purpose for which the proof is offered, which in turn
determines whether, and how strictly, the requirement of proof of similarity of condi-
tions will be applied.
McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 200, at 473 (footnotes omitted).
The trial judge would thus formulate a similarity standard and apply it on an ad hoc basis. This
often resulted in inconsistent interpretations and applications of the standard. See infra notes 28-
30 and accompanying text.
15. On January 2, 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Pub. L. No.
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 101-1103 (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
16. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
17. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
18. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 200; 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 252
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979); Barker, supra note 5; Keeton, Products Liabiliy-Problems Pertaining
to Proof of Negligence 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1973); Lascher, supra note 5; Morris, supra note 5.
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an overview of similar fact evidence in the closely allied criminal con-
text. Part Two presents a statutory analysis of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b) and explains that a majority of courts employ such an
analysis when faced with prior act evidence in the criminal context.
Finally, Part Three analyzes the impact of rule 404(b) upon the admis-
sibility of prior accident evidence in product liability litigation and
demonstrates that the inclusionary approach best achieves equitable
and consistent results.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PRIOR ACT EVIDENCE
4. Prior Accident Evidence in Product Liability Litigation
Historically, a split of authority has existed over the admissibility of
proof of prior accidents in product liability cases.' 9 Courts adhering to
the minority approach2' totally excluded evidence of other accidents or
injuries.2 Courts following the majority view" analyzed the purpose
for which the proponent offered the evidence and then defined an ad-
missibility standard relevant to that purpose.23 Admissibility standards
varied in the degree of similarity required between the prior accident
19. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Collins v. Inhabitants of Dorchester, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 396 (1850). Collins
represented the majority view until Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 401 (1872), which first
questioned the Collins doctrine. See infra notes 21 & 22.
21. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 458, at 584. Wigmore states the rule in a discussion
of Collins v. Inhabitants of Dorchester, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 396 (1850):
That ruling proceeded from the point of view both of relevancy and of auxiliary proba-
tive policy, though without any full consideration of either reason; and, coming at a
comparatively early date, served for a long time as a stumbling block to many courts
whose instinct would have led them to receive such evidence.
2 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 18, § 458 at 584.
22. The New Hampshire Supreme Court first refuted the minority view in Darling v. West-
moreland, 52 N.H. 401 (1872). In Darling, the trial court excluded evidence of a prior accident
upon a road, adhering to the then majority view, set out in cases like Collins v. Inhabitants of
Dorchester, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 396 (1850). See supra note 20. The evidence was offered to show
defects in the highway.
Reversing the trial court, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied a logical and legal rele-
vancy test, noting:
The only rule relied upon to exclude ... [evidence] in such a case as this, is the rule
requiring the evidence to be confined to the issue,--that is, to the facts put in controversy
by the pleadings, prohibiting the trial of collateral issues,-that is, of facts not put in
issue by the pleadings, and excluding such evidence as tends solely to prove facts not
involved in the issue. This rule merely requires evidence to be relevant. It merely ex-
cludes what is irrelevant.
52 N.H. at 405.
23. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 200, at 473-76.
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and the accident involved in the present dispute. These similarity re-
quirements acted as limitations to admissibility of prior accident evi-
dence, and ultimately became "similarity tests" for admissibility.2 4
Similarity tests fall along a sliding scale of admissibility. The most
lenient standard merely requires the defendant to have knowledge of
the prior accident. The strictest test demands identity of conditions be-
tween the two accidents.25 Courts currently use this similarity test ap-
proach to determine admissibility of prior accident evidence. 26 The
purpose for which the proponent offers the evidence dictates the degree
of similarity needed for admissibility.27 The similarity test controls ad-
missibility, but the degree of similarity required may vary at a court's
discretion.
Logical relevance is not the sole test governing the admissibility of
prior accident evidence. Rather than relying solely on judicial discre-
tion to weigh the evidence's probative value against the danger of un-
fair prejudice, courts apply similarity tests for admissibility dependent
upon the proponent's purposes for offering the evidence. The trial
judge confines his analysis to categorizing the evidence as defined by
these purposes. The judge then excludes the evidence if it is not suffi-
ciently similar to conditions surrounding the prior accident.
For example, in Robitaille v. Netoco Community Theaters,28 an action
for personal injuries resulting from a fall on theater stairs allegedly
caused by loose carpet, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
refused to admit evidence of a prior fall on the same stairs to establish
the dangerous condition of the carpeted staircase. The court stated that
evidence of prior accidents or injuries caused by a dangerous product
or condition was admissible to show the danger of the condition. It
required, however, substantial identity of conditions and human be-
havior between the two incidents involved, which the plaintiff was un-
24. See McCoMIulcK, supra note 2, § 200, at 473-76. See also infra notes 32-45 for represen-
tative cases describing purposes and limitations upon admissibility. It is beyond the scope of this
Note to extensively analyze the variety of tests used by various jurisdictions to subtly enforce these
limitations upon admissibility.
25. In Uitts v. General Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the court stated the
test for admitting evidence of prior accidents: "If plaintiffs are attempting to prove the existence
of a specific defect or malfunction it is clear that the admission into evidence of the occurrence of
similar accidents would require a showing that those accidents were caused by the same malfunc-
tion or defect." Id at 1383 (emphasis added).
26. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 24; infra notes 33-34.
28. 305 Mass. 265, 25 N.E.2d 749 (1940).
[Vol. 61:799
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able to establish.29 The court noted, in addition, that admission of such
evidence must not create a serious danger of confusion of the issues.30
The approach used in the early case of Dyas v. Southern Pacfc Co. 3 1
contrasts with the Robitaille approach. In Dyas, an insecure platform
gave way and a derrick fell, killing an employee of the defendant. The
plaintiff sued for the employee's wrongful death. The California
Supreme Court admitted evidence of a prior accident on the same
platform five years earlier to show that the platform was in fact danger-
ous or defective at the time of the accident.3 2 The court added that
such evidence may also establish that the defendant had knowledge of
the danger involved, or that the dangerous condition of the platform
caused the plaintiffs injuries.33 The Dyas court liberally interpreted
the substantial identity test.3 4 It did not balance the evidence's proba-
29. Id at 268-69, 25 N.E.2d at 751.
30 The Robataille court states the test:
Usually the failure to show substantial identity of the circumstances of the incident on
trial with those of the incidents offered in evidence, or the danger of unfairness, confu-
sion or unreasonable expenditure of time in trying the latter, has led to a justified exclu-
sion of the evidence, in a wise exercise of discretion if not through the application of a
positive rule of law.
Id at 267, 25 N.E.2d at 750 (footnote omitted).
31. 140 Cal. 296, 73 P. 972 (1903).
32. Id at 305, 73 P. at 974. The plaintiff also introduced evidence that the defendants had
not repaired the platform in the interim. Id at 304, 73 P. at 973. The court stated:
The pertinency of the evidence was to the insecure condition of the substructure, upon
which the derrick rested, and defendant's knowledge of it and inattention to it. Nor is
the matter of remoteness any objection; the remoteness of the former accident, with the
showing that no measures were taken in the interim to prevent a reoccurrence, is of the
substance and materiality of the proof; in the natural order of decay, what was bad many
years before, must, in the nature of things, be worse at the end of that time. Nor was it a
collateral matter. The Dyas derrick was operated upon the same substructure, as far as
method by which it was attached was concerned, and the condition of that substructure
at the time of the accident was a proper subject of inquiry.
Id at 304-05, 73 P. at 974.
33. id at 305, 73 P. 974. The trial judge instructed the jury that: "It]ihe occurrence of acci-
dents, similar to the one under scrutiny, is of greater or less value in determining how much care is
reasonable to exact in a particular case." On appeal, the state supreme court upheld the require-
ment that the prior accident be "similar to the one under scrutiny," stating:
[Tlhe plaintiff had a right to have the jury instructed, that they could take into considera-
tion previous accidents similar to the one in question, in determining the probable cause
of a subsequent one. It is that similarity which permits them to be shown in evidence
and considered by the jury. In its general effect this is what the court told the jury. It
was stating a general principle of law, and, we think, stated it correctly.
Id at 306, 73 P. at 975.
34. If the evidence does not satisfy this test, however, a court would rule such evidence inad-
missible. See Langford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 513 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1975); Walker v. Trico
Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 415 U.S. 978 (1974); Hecht Co. v. Jacobsen,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tive value against its attendant dangers. Instead, it admitted the evi-
dence exclusively in terms of similarity of conditions and lack of
intervening acts which might alter these conditions.35
Thus, courts adhering to the exclusionary approach in determining
admissibility of prior accident evidence developed standards of "simi-
larity" requirements which were triggered by the proponent's purpose
for offering the evidence.
Other courts follow an inclusionary approach to admissibility of
prior accident evidence. Under the inclusionary approach, even when
substantial identity cannot be established, evidence of prior accidents
or injuries can be admitted if relevant to show the defendant's knowl-
edge of the danger.36
In Hecht Co. v. Jacobsen,37 an action for injuries sustained by a mi-
nor when her hand was caught in an opening in an escalator in the
defendant's store, the court stated that evidence of a prior accident has
always been admitted to demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of a
defective or dangerous condition. 8 Thus, in jurisdictions following the
inclusionary approach, relevancy 39 dictates the admissibility of prior
180 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Uitts v. General Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Birmingham Union Ry. v. Alexander, 93 Ala. 133, 9 So. 525 (1891); Narring v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 59 Mich. App. 717, 229 N.W.2d 901 (1975). See generalo McCoRMICK, SUpra note 2, § 200,
at 475.
35. Dyas v. Southern Pac. Co., 140 Cal. 296, 73 P. 972 (1903). In admitting the evidence the
court stated:
If five years previously, the substructure was in such a condition as to fail to retain the
derrick in its hold upon it, proof of that fact, coupled with proof of no repairs, was
matter properly to go before the jury, in determining whether the substructure was not in
a similar, if not worse condition, when Dyas was killed, and whether the accident was
not directly attributable to that fact. We think there was no error committed in allowing
the evidence.
Id at 305, 73 P. at 974.
36. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
37. 180 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
38. Id at 17. Accord District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519 (1882); Capital Traction
Co. v. Copland, 47 App. D.C. 15-2 (1917); Dyas v. Southern Pac. Co., 140 Cal. 296, 73 P. 972
(1903). In the Armes case the Supreme Court stated:
The frequency of accidents at a particular place would seem to be good evidence of its
dangerous character .... Here the character of the place was dne of the subjects of
inquiry. . . and the defendant should have been prepared to show its real character in
the face of any proof bearing on that subject.
107 U.S. at 525.
In Armes the Court used the two-prong relevancy test of materiality ("subject inquiry") and
probativeness ("good evidence of its dangerous character") in ruling on the admissibility of the
prior accident evidence.
39. See District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1882). See also supra note 38.
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accident evidence.'40
When the issue shifts from evidence of prior accidents to evidence of
absence of prior accidents, the distinction between the two analytical
approaches becomes even more apparent. The majority of courts, ad-
herents of the inclusionary approach, deem evidence of a lack of prior
accidents inadmissible.4' These courts reason that such evidence has
little probative value and raises too many collateral issues.
In Blackwell v. JJ Newberry Co. ,42 the plaintiff sustained injuries
after falling over a small stepladder in an aisle in defendant's depart-
ment store. The defendant tried to prove lack of negligence and lack of
an unsafe condition by offering evidence of an absence of prior acci-
dents. The court rejected the evidence, however, fearing that it would
cloud the issues and result in jury confusion.43 It found that the danger
of confusion of the issues outweighed the relevance and probative
value of the evidence.44 Thus, under the inclusionary analysis, courts
have refused to admit even logically relevant evidence because of pol-
icy considerations.
Courts following the exclusionary approach initially apply the exclu-
sionary similarity tests to evidence of lack of prior accidents. If the
40. In Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 351 U.S. 183 (1956), the Supreme Court granted
a motion to recall the judgment, but failed to rule directly on the issue of the proper test courts
should use in determining the admissibility of evidence of prior accidents. In a dissenting opinion,
however, Mr. Justice Black stated: "What better proof could there be than the fact that the rail-
road knew there had been repeated accidents at the same location of the kind that brought about
Cahill's injury? No fair system of evidence would exclude such testimony when issues are raised
like those involved here." Id at 189-90 (Black, J., dissenting).
41. See Rayner v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 120 Ariz. 328, 585 P.2d 1240 (1978); Sanitary Gro-
cery Co. v. Steinbrecher, 183 Va. 495, 32 S.E.2d 685 (1945). But see Koloda v. General Motors
Parts Div., No. 82-3314 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 1983) (current standards for admissibility of lack of prior
accidents).
See generally Morris, supra note 5; Comment, Proof of Safety History in Railroad Crossing Acci-
dent Cases, 28 Tax. L. REv. 76 (1956).
42. 156 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941).
43. Id at 19-20. The court cited Professor Wigmore's "Auxiliary Probative Policy" theory,
which provides that even logically relevant evidence can be ruled inadmissible because of an
auxiliary principle or policy, such as confusion of issues, unfair surprise, or undue prejudice. He
stated further that "the unrestricted admission of such instances might result in so multiplying the
subordinate issues in a cause that confusion of mind would ensue and the main controversy would
be lost sight of in the great mass of minor issues." Id See 1 J. WIGMoR, EVIDENCE § 29a (3d ed.
1940) (discussion of the auxiliary probative policy theory). See also Vinyard v. Vinyard Funeral
Home, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
But see McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 200, at 477 (refuting the application of the auxiliary pro-
bative policy theory as applied to lack of prior accident evidence).
44. 156 S.W.2d at 19-21.
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evidence of lack of prior accidents fails the similarity tests, courts reject
the evidence." Therefore, while both approaches to admissibility of
evidence of lack of prior accidents will on occasion produce consistent
results, 46 the approaches remain analytically distinct.
In summary, before the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), the majority of courts followed the exclusionary approach and
admitted prior accident evidence in product liability cases only if the
evidence met the similarity test. Courts applied a strict similarity stan-
dard, requiring nearly identical conditions, if the proponent offered the
evidence to establish the existence of a dangerous condition. A broader
similarity standard was applied, however, if the proponent offered the
evidence to establish the defendant's knowledge of the dangerous
condition.47
The minority view, prior to the adoption of the federal rules, permit-
ted the admission of prior accident evidence if such evidence was rele-
vant to the issue in dispute. Courts discarded the similarity tests in
favor of a relevancy analysis, but retained control over the scope of
admissibility of prior act evidence and collateral issues within the rele-
vancy framework.
B. Prior Act Evidence in the Criminal Context
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence a similar
split of authority existed regarding prior act evidence in the criminal
context.48 The danger of using prior act evidence to develop an im-
proper inference between prior and present conduct49 increases consid-
45. See, e.g., Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 978 (1974). The Walker court stated:
Generally speaking, evidence of this sort is properly admitted only if the party defend-
ant shows, as foundation, that the absence of prior accidents took place with respect to
machines substantially identical to the one at issue and used in settings and circum-
stances sufficiently similar to those surrounding the machine at the time of the accident
to allow the jury to connect past experience with the accident sued upon.
id
46. See supra notes 34 & 41.
47. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
49. For example, in United States v. Clemons, 503 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1974), the court ex-
pressed this concern: "The defendant is to be convicted, if at all, on the evidence showing him to
be guilty of the particular offense charged. To admit evidence of other crimes possibly committed
by the defendant prejudices him before the jury." Id at 489. See generally Comment, Evidence-
Proof of Particular Facts-Evidence That Defendant May Have Committed Sinilar Crimes Is Ad-
missible to Prove Corpus Delicti of Murder, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1074 (1974).
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erably in the criminal context because of constitutional concerns that
the defendant receive a fair trial.5" Because the element of proof of
criminal intent frequently rests upon prior act evidence, however, the
need for such evidence is often as great as in the civil context.5"
Prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the majority of
courts excluded prior act evidence in the criminal context,52 subject,
however, to a limited number of exceptions.53 The United States
Supreme Court noted circumstances in the criminal context in which a
court could admit prior act evidence.54 In these circumstances, limiting
instructions and the trial judge's discretionary power to rule such evi-
dence inadmissible, if he believed the danger of the evidence out-
weighed its probative value, protected the defendant's interests in a fair
trial.55 The trial judge could not rule such evidence admissible, how-
ever, unless it first fell within one of the recognized exceptions to the
general rule of exclusion. 56
50. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
51. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1966), in which the appellants claimed that the use of
prior convictions "was so egregiously unfair upon the issue of guilt or innocence as to offend the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at 559. The Supreme Court rejected the appel-
lants' contentions and stated:
[Tihe jury learns of prior crimes committed by the defendant, but the conceded possi-
bility of prejudice is believed to be outweighed by the validity of the State's purpose in
permitting introduction of the evidence. The defendant's interests are protected by limit-
ing instructions, and by the discretion residing with the trial judge to limit or forbid the
admission of particularly prejudicial evidence even though admissible under an accepted
rule of evidence.
Id at 561 (citations omitted).
52. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), in which the Supreme Court set
forth the common law rationale for this view. The Court stated that prior act evidence, while
usually relevant, was excluded because such evidence created too great a risk of prejudice for the
jury The Court feared that the defendant would be accused because he was a "bad man," rather
than because of his commission of the crime. 355 U.S. at 475-76. See also Slough & Knightly,
supra note 4, at 326; supra note 50. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190; Stone, supra
note 1, at 1025.
53. In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1966), the Supreme Court acknowledged that a court
could admit such evidence, even though it carried a potential for prejudice, if it fell within a
recognized exception. See infra note 54.
54. In Spencer the Supreme Court stated:
Because such evidence is generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice, it is
usually excluded except when it is particularly probative in showing such things as in-
tent. . . an element in the crime. . . identity,. . . malice,. . . motive,. . . a system of
criminal activity,. . . or when the defendant has raised the issue of his character, .. or
when the defendant has testified and the State seeks to impeach his credibility.
Id at 560-61 (citations omitted).
55. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 (1966).
56. See id at 554; Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 459 (1948); United States v. Calvert,
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A strong minority of courts, proponents of the inclusionary view, co-
existed with the exclusionary approach, even in the criminal context.57
Under this approach, prior act evidence had to be substantially rele-
vant for a purpose other than to show the defendant's criminal charac-
ter. 8 The trial judge then balanced the probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial character,5 9 and ruled on the admissibility of the
evidence.60
Thus, prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts,
even in the criminal context, were divided over the proper admissibility
standard for prior act evidence. Courts either automatically excluded
such evidence unless it fit into an excepted category, or admitted the
evidence if relevant and more probative than prejudicial.
523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d
427 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963);
Swann v. United States, 195 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1952); Paris v. United States, 260 F. 529 (8th Cir.
1919); Fish v. United States, 215 F. 544 (Ist Cir. 1914). InKnohl, the Court enunciated the exclu-
sionary test but then balanced the logical and legal relevancy of the proffered evidence. The court
thus mixed elements of both the exclusionary and the inclusionary approaches. 379 F.2d at 438-
39. See generally Stone, supra note 1, at 1006; Symposium, Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence.-
The Needfor a Two-Step Analyss, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 635 (1976).
57. See United States v. Deaton, 381 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1967). In Deaton, the court stated:
"A minority of courts has adopted the inclusionary form of the rule, that is, that evidence of other
crimes is admissible except when offered solely to prove criminal character. This form is favored
by the commentators and has been recognized and used by this court." Id at 117 (citation omit-
ted). Thus the Second Circuit, with the Deaton decision, expressly advocated the inclusionary
approach. The court did not distinguish United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1967), nor
United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963), but cited Knohl as a
case supporting the inclusionary approach. See supra note 56.
58. Id See generally Slough & Knightly, supra note 4, at 326-27.
59. United States v. Deaton, 381 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1967).
60. See United States v. Kaufman, 453 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Knol, 379
F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 973 (1967); Swann v. United States, 195 F.2d 689 (4th
Cir. 1952); People v. Woods, 35 CaL 2d 504, 218 P.2d 981 (1950); State v. Scott, Ill Utah 9, 175
P.2d 1016 (1947). See also United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 1965) (trial judge
should be afforded a wide range of discretion).
Prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Model Code of Evidence adopted the
inclusionary approach.
[Elvidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion is
inadmissible as tending to prove that he committed a crime or civil wrong on another
occasion if, but only if, the evidence is relevant solely as tending to prove his disposition
to commit such a crime or civil wrong or to commit crimes or civil wrongs generally.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 311 (1942). See generally Stone, supra note 1, at 1020 (analysis
of the theoretical differences and the policy distinctions between the inclusionary and exclusionary
approaches).
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II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B)
Congress intended the Federal Rules of Evidence to provide a clear
and uniform standard of admissibility for evidence used in the federal
courts.6" Rule 404(b), however, has failed to resolve the conffict be-
tween the exclusionary and the inclusionary approaches to prior act
evidence.62
A growing number of courts have held that rule 404(b) adopts the
inclusionary approach to the admissibility of prior act evidence. 63 The
legislative history of the rule reveals that Congress did not intend it to
be a rule of exclusion.64 The text of the rule also suggests an inclusion-
61. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974),reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7054 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. See also H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075 [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT].
62. See Symposium, supra note 56. "Two distinct approaches to the list of exceptions have
developed--the inclusionary and exclusionary approaches--and recent interpretations of Rule
404(b) reflect them both." Id at 636.
For cases using an inclusionary approach after adoption of the Rules, see, e.g., United States v.
Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir.
1977); United States v. Riggins, 539 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977);
United States v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976); United
States v. Ellis, 493 F. Supp. 1092 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); State v. Leecy, 294 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. 1980);
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981).
For cases using an exclusionary approach after adoption of the Rules, see, e.g., Garcia v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 657 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bowman, 602 F.2d 160 (8th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1978).
63. See supra note 62.
64. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 61, which provides:
The second sentence of Rule 404(b) as submitted to this Congress began with the
words 'This subdivision does not exclude the evidence when offered.' The Committee
amended the language to read 'It may, however, be admissible,' the words used in the
1971 Advisory Committee draft, on the ground that this formulation properly placed
greater emphasis on admissibility than did the final court version.
Id at 7081. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 61, which states: "[I]t is anticipated that with
respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the trial judge may exclude it only on the basis of
those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e., prejudice, confusion or waste of time." Id at 7071.
Congress placed only two limitations upon admissibility of relevant evidence. First, prior act
evidence is inadmissible to show a defendant's propensity to commit such acts or to be a "bad
person." Second, rule 403 is to be applied to prior act evidence to determine whether the dangers
created by the evidence outweigh its probative value. See United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976). In Fairchild, the Seventh Circuit applied the
following admissibility test to evidence of other crimes:
Evidence of other criminal transactions is, of course, not admissible to show that the
defendant has a 'propensity' to commit the charged offense. . . . Such evidence may,
however, be admissible if, entirely apart from the matter of "propensity," it has a ten-
dency to make the existence of an element of the crime charged more probable than it
would be without such evidence. See Rules 401 and 404(b) of the Fed. Rules of Evi-
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ary approach:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity there-
with. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident.65
The key to a statutory analysis of the rule centers on the question of
whether the words "such as" make the list of acceptable purposes ex-
haustive or illustrative. The use of the words "such as" clearly con-
notes a suggestive or illustrative list of purposes.66 Moreover, the use of
the discretionary word "may" suggests a grant of permission to admit
the evidence.67  Taken together, 6 "may" and "such as" indicate that
dence;. . . Even though relevant, the evidence could have been excluded had the trial
court found that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Fed. Rule of Evi-
dence 403.
Id at 188-89 (citation omitted). See also Hammann v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 620 F.2d
588 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978);
State v. Leecy, 294 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. 1980).
For an analysis of this approach, see generally Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, (pt. 1) 5 U. KAN.
L. Rav. 1 (1956); Slough & Knightly, supra note 4; Symposium, supra note 56; Comment, supra
note 49; Comment, Federal Rules ofEvidence-Rule 404(b) Limits the Admission of Other Crimes
Evidence, Under an Inclusionary Approach, to Cases Where it is Relevant to an Issue in Dispute, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 574 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Federal Rules ofEvidence]; Com-
ment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial. OfBalancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961).
65. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). See infra notes 69-76.
66. Advocates of the exclusionary approach view the rule's list of acceptable purposes as
exhaustive, while advocates of the inclusionary approach view the list as merely illustrative. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
67. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 61. The report states:
[The committee] anticipates that the use of the discretionary word 'may' with respect to
the admissibility of evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts is not intended to confer any
arbitrary discretion on the trial judge. Rather, it is anticipated that with respect to per-
missible uses for such evidence, the trial judge may exclude it only on the basis of those
considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e., prejudice, confusion or waste of time.
Id at 7071.
68. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4908 (3d ed. 1943), dis-
cusses a maxim of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis:
In case the legislative intent is not clear, the meaning of doubtful words may be deter-
mined by reference to their association with other associated words and phrases. . . . At
best the maxim merely represents a conclusion that considering the language of the en-
tire act, its subject matter, and the available evidences of legislative intent, the interpreta-
tion of the court is consistent with the legislative purposes.
Id (footnotes omitted).
Thus, by combining the use of the discretionary words "may" and "such as" with the legislative
intent of facilitating the admissibility of relevant, non-prejudicial evidence, it is clear that the
second sentence of rule 404(b) embraces an inclusionary approach to admissibility, the list of
purposes being illustrative, not exhaustive.
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although courts may not admit the evidence for the "bad character"
purpose described in the rule's first sentence, courts may admit it for
any other purpose, such as those listed in the second sentence.
The discretion granted by Congress in the second sentence of rule
404(b), however, is not unlimited. Rule 404(b) must be considered in
par! materia with the other rules of evidence dealing with relevancy.
Rule 401 defines "relevant evidence." 69 Rule 402 puts forth the general
rule that all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise pro-
vided by the Constitution, Congress, the Federal Rules of Evidence or
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.70 Rule 403 outlines the
considerations that may render logically relevant evidence inadmissi-
ble.7 ' Considering these three rules in pari materia72 with rule 404(b),
69. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states:
'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
FED. R. EviD. 401.
70. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 states:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
FED. R. EvID. 402.
7 1. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
FED. R EvID. 403. See also United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978). In Beechum
the court stated:
[T]he judge must consider the danger of undue prejudice. . . when he determines
whether to admit the extrinsic offense evidence. The judge should be mindful that the
test under rule 403 is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially out-
weighed by its unfair prejudice. . . . "'IT]he discretionary policy against undue
prejudice would seem to require exclusion only in those instances where the trial judge
believes that there is a genuine risk that emotions of the jury will be excited to irrational
behavior, and that this risk is disproportionate to the probative value of the offered
evidence."
Id at 915 n.20 (quoting Trautman, Logical or Legal Relerancy-A Conflict in Theorj; 5 VAND. L.
REv. 385, 410 (1952)).
72 J, SUTHERLAND, supra note 68, defines in pari materia:
The intent of the legislature when a statute is found to be ambiguous may be gathered
from statutes relating to the same subject matter--statutes inpari materia. On the pre-
sumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the previous
statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is held that in the absence of any express
repeal or amendment therein, the new provision was enacted in accord with the legisla-
tive policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be construed together.
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several guidelines emerge to aid in the proper application of rule
404(b).
First, the only limitations upon prior act evidence under the Federal
Rules of Evidence are those defined by rules 402, 403 and 404(b).73
Second, the first sentence of rule 404(b) establishes a limitation on ad-
missibility of similar fact evidence. That sentence identifies the one
absolute limitation against admission of logically relevant prior act evi-
dence. The second sentence of rule 404(b), by using the word "how-
ever," clearly demarcates the end of the exclusion defined in the first
sentence of the rule. This second sentence returns the focus of the rule
to the inclusionary approach to admissibility evident in rules 401 and
402. Finally, the judge must apply the balancing test in rule 403 before
making an ultimate decision on the admissibility of the evidence.74
This test requires the court to weigh the probative value of the evidence
against the danger created by admission of the evidence.75
Id at § 5201.
Sutherland adds to this definition:
[A]pplication of the rule that statutes in par! materia should be construed together is
most justified in the case of statutes relating to the same subject matter that were passed
at the same session of the legislature, especially if they were passed or approved or take
effect on the same day . . . In these situations the probability that acts relating to the
same subject matter were activated by the same policy is very high, for . . . they were
enacted by the same men and . . . were declared to be within the knowledge of the
Legislature at the same time.
Id § 5202 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, Federal Rules of Evidence 401-404(b), which relate to the same subject matter, relevancy
of proffered evidence, were passed by the same session of the legislature, and were approved to
take effect on the same day, should be construed inpari mater/a in order to determine the overall
legislative scheme for admissibility of such evidence.
73. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Bailleaux, 685
F.2d 1105, 1111 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982).
74. See supra note 71.
75. To summarize, rule 402 states that all relevant evidence is admissible unless specifically
excluded. Rule 401 defines relevancy, and rule 403 provides limitations upon the general rule of
admissibility to avoid unfair prejudicial impact. Rule 404(b) fits into this scheme by first describ-
ing a rule of exclusion. Then, however, it refers to the general tenor of rule 402 of inclusion of
relevant evidence by listing illustrative examples of acceptable purposes for the admission of prior
act evidence. This sentence contrasts with the single unacceptable purpose narrowly defined in
the first sentence of rule 404(b). As Sutherland explains:
[G]eneral and special acts may be in pari materia. If so, they should be construed
together. Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with
a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if
possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail. . . . unless it appears that the
legislature intended to make the general act controlling.
J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 68, § 5204 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, the rule of general admissibility of relevant evidence (rule 402) is the general view, but
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Most courts in jurisdictions which follow the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence adhere to this inclusionary approach in criminal litigation.76
This interpretation of Rule 404(b) is not only the clear trend77 but is
also the sounder construction of the statute. The rule on its face makes
no distinction between the civil and criminal context.78 Furthermore,
the drafters of the rule have suggested that courts should follow the
inclusionary approach. 9 Therefore, courts should extend the inclusio-
nary approach to product liability litigation. 0
the specific prohibition of the first sentence of rule 404(b) would prevail if the evidence proffered
created a conflict between rules 402 and 404(b). The language of the specific element of exclusion,
however, is very narrow and only relates to the "specific" forbidden act of proving character and
conforming behavior. Therefore, courts should not admit evidence offered solely for this limited
purpose in light of the general view of admissibility of all relevant evidence expressed in rule 402.
76. See supra note 62 for cases which adhere to the inclusionary theory of admissibility.
In United States v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975), the court of appeals applied the inclu-
sionary approach in holding that evidence of prior acts, to be admissible, does not have to consti-
tute evidence of criminal acts. "We do not agree that similar acts introduced to establish motive,
intent, the absence of mistake or accident, or a common scheme or plan must necessarily be acts
constituting a crime." Id at 143.
Even though courts had not previously levied such a limitation upon prior acts evidence, the
defendant in Senak tried to bar admissibility of his prior non-criminal activity using a theory of
prejudice based upon prior criminal behavior. The court rejected this convoluted argument:
Probably most of the cases dealing with the precise issue (admissibility) have involved
other acts which were of a criminal nature because of the court's concern that a defend-
ant may be unduly damaged in the eyes of the trier of fact by being considered a com-
mon criminal .... .. mhe defendant would be being [sic] tried on the purity of his
character rather than on his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.
Id Thus the court denied Senak the policy protection, which would dictate barring evidence
based on "criminal character" grounds, and admitted the offered evidence. Yet the court still
applied the rule 403 test for prejudicial danger, for "criminal character" is not the exclusionary
bar any "bad character" inference is enough if such an inference outweighs the probative value of
the proffered evidence.
In United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1979), the court further refined the test
for admissibility of prior act evidence by adding the following criteria: (1) a material issue must
be involved relevant to the evidence being offered; (2) defendant's guilt of the other crime must be
clear and convincing; (3) the other crime must be similar and reasonably close in time to the case
at bar; and (4) the evidence must pass the rule 403 balancing test. Id at 1365. See also United
States v. Little, 562 F.2d 578, 581 (8th Cir. 1977). See generally Dolan, Rule 403: The Preudice
Rule m Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 220, 224 (1976).
77. See supra note 62.
78. See infra note 84.
79. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee note.
80. See generally Hill, .4 Judge's View of the Trial of a Products Liability Case in Federal
Court-The Impact of the Federal Rules of Evidence, [hereinafter cited as Hill,,A Judge's View] in
S. METHODIST U. PRODUCTS LIABILITY INsTITUTE, THE TRIAL OF THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CASE, 2-1 (V. Walkowiak ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as PRODUCTS LIABILITY INSTITUTE].
Opponents of the inclusionary approach argue that it may lead to undue prejudice to the de-
fendant or to prosecutorial overzealousness. See, e.g., United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303 (9th
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III. IMPACT OF RULE 404(B) UPON PRIOR ACCIDENT EVIDENCE
Following the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts
failed to develop the inclusionary approach to similar fact evidence in
product liability litigation as they had in the criminal context.8 ' Arbi-
trary exclusion of logically relevant evidence stifles thorough product
liability litigation. Courts currently exclude critically needed, relevant
evidence by improperly following the exclusionary approach to admis-
sibility of evidence of prior accidents.8 2
Although most commentators focus on the criminal applications of
the rule, 3 rule 404(b) is equally applicable to prior act evidence in civil
litigation." Because Congress intended to incorporate the inclusionary
approach to admissibility of prior act evidence into rule 404(b), 5 the
rule must substantially alter the traditional standards of admissibility
of such evidence in product liability suits. These standards turn upon
Cir. 1977). Yet, proper application of the rule 404(b) test for admissibility allows the trial judge to
control the element of prejudice by employing the rule 403 balancing test before admitting evi-
dence of prior acts. See United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1979); MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 2, § 190, at 453. While rule 404(b) does relax the standards for admitting the
defendant's other crimes into evidence, the trial judge still retains the administrative control in the
courtroom necessary to prevent admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence, or evidence improp-
erly offered by overzealous prosecutors.
81. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 75 (D. Mass. 1976) (adhering
to similarity standard regarding admissibility of evidence of prior accidents in product liability
litigation); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 64 Ill. App. 3d 770, 785, 381 N.E.2d 715, 727 (1978)
(same); Holbrook v. Koehring, 75 Mich. App. 592, 593, 255 N.W.2d 698, 699 (1977) (same); Magic
Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (same); Caldwell v. Yamaha
Motor Co. Ltd., 648 P.2d 519, 526 (Wyo. 1982) (same).
82. See infra notes 86-88.
83. See Slough & Knightly, supra note 4; Stone, supra note 1; Symposium, supra note 56;
Comment, supra note 49.
84. The full title of rule 404 is "Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Ex-
ceptions; Other Crimes." The title, on its face, seems to imply that the rule is limited to the
criminal context, or at least to admissibility of "other crimes" evidence. However, rule 404(b) is
entitled "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts." Because effect must be given to every word, clause and
sentence of a statute, J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 68, § 4705, to conclude that rule 404(b) is limited
to other crimes or strictly the criminal context is to overlook this express expansion of classes of
evidence which rule 404(b) is to control. See United States v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975)
(similar acts evidence need not be acts constituting a crime). In Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63
(N.D. 1981), the North Dakota Supreme Court construing North Dakota's version of Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b), stated that "the requirement that the court assess the probatjve worth of
the evidence is equally applicable in civil [as well as criminal] cases." Id at 70. See also Ramos v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334 modeled, 620 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1112 (1981); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C.
1979); American Nat'l. Watermattress Corp. v. Manville, 642 P.2d 1330 (Alaska 1982).
85. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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the purpose for which the evidence is offered. Courts have identified
five purposes for which prior accident evidence is offered. These pur-
poses include: to prove that a particular physical condition, product
defect, or situation exists; to prove that the plaintiffs injury was caused
by this condition, defect or situation; to prove that the situation or envi-
ronment in which the accident occurred was dangerous; to prove that
the defendant knew or should have known of the danger; and, to rebut
the defendant's assertion that the injury sued for could not have been
caused by the defendant's conduct.86 These purposes will be separately
considered. The impact of the inclusionary approach to admissibility
of prior accident evidence upon these purposes compels the conclusion
that such evidence should be admitted if the two-prong test of logical
and legal relevance, as defined by rules 404(b) and 403, is satisfied.
A. Prior Accident Evidence to Prove Defective Product
When plaintiffs offer evidence of a prior accident to prove the exist-
ence of a particular condition, situation or defect, they face a number
of traditional limitations upon admission of such evidence. Traditional
admissibility standards variously include requirements that the prior
accident occurred with either an "identical product,"87 a "substantially
similar product,"88 or a "similar product."89 These limitations exist be-
cause prior accident evidence has a strong impact upon the jury, which
creates a danger that the jury may use the evidence improperly.9" A
related concern is that the need for such evidence may not overcome its
"sensational" aspect if admitted.9
Under the inclusionary approach, if the trial judge finds the evidence
relevant, he simply applies the rule 403 test.92 The rule 403 balancing
86. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 200, at 473-76.
87. See, eg., Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1978); Uitts v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
73 F.RD. 73, 75 (D. Mass. 1976); Narring v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 59 Mich. App. 717, 725, 229
N.W.2d 901, 904 (1975); Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
88. See, e.g., Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 339 moded, 620 F.2d 464 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S 1112 (1981); Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. Kahn Constr.
Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 89 (D.S.C. 1979); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd., 648 P.2d 519, 521
(Wyo. 1982).
89. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Koehrng Co., 75 Mich. App. 592, 255 N.W.2d 698 (1977); Seavy v.
Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980).
90. See supra note 9.
91. See general, MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 200, at 474 n.42.
92. See supra notes 72 & 74 and accompanying text.
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test allows the trial judge to weigh the need for the evidence against its
potential for unfair prejudice, without the added burden of applying an
artificial standard of admissibility. Under this approach, if prior acci-
dent evidence is relevant to the existence of a particular physical condi-
tion, situation or defect, the trial judge would apply the balancing
tests93 of rules 404(b) and 403. The judge would not automatically ex-
clude such relevant evidence on the basis of a lack of substantial simi-
larity.14 Rule 404(b) does not levy a similarity requirement against the
proffered evidence, and rule 402 prevents courts from engrafting such a
requirement under the guise of rule 404(b). 95
B. Prior Accident Evidence to Prove Causation
If a plaintiff offers evidence of a prior accident to show that the al-
leged defective or dangerous condition caused the plaintiff's injury, the
traditional limitation upon admissibility requires substantially similar
or similar96 conditions to exist between the prior accident and the acci-
dent in question.
In contrast, the Federal Rules apply a two-pronged test for admissi-
bility, the balancing and relevancy test of rules 403 and 404(b). Al-
though the judge may consider similarity between the two accidents as
one of the factors in determining admissibility, he does not need to
93. No other test or standard for relevancy or prejudice is required to determine admissibility
of proffered evidence under the Federal Rules. See Hill,.4 Judge's View, supra note 80, at 2-5, in
PRODUCTS LIABILiTY INSTITUTE, supra note 80.
94. See Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C.
1979). In Campus Sweater, the court distinguishes the "similarity" standard, an admissibility stan-
dard, from the more viable approach which uses the similarity requirement as a weight issue going
to the ultimate jury question of sufficiency of the evidence. The court stated: "[R]ealizing that
hundreds of potentially different factors are present in every situation, courts have also held .that
perfect similarity is not required, but that dissimilarities brought out on cross-examination go to
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility." Id at 90.
This approach to the similarity standard is consistent with the Federal Rules. Courts that use
similarity as a test for admissibility of prior accident evidence are introducing an additional stan-
dard to be met other than the required tests of rules 402, 403 and 404(b). Rule 402 expressly
forbids courts from creating additional admissibility tests. See supra notes 70-74 and accompany-
ing text.
95. See supra notes 70-76.
96. See Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334 modfed, 620 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 64 111. App. 3d 770, 381 N.E.2d
715 (1978); Holbrook v. Koehring Co., 75 Mich. App. 592, 255 N.W.2d 698 (1977); Caldwell v.
Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd., 648 P.2d 519 (Wyo. 1982). See generally McCoRMICK, supra note 2,
§ 200, at 474 nn.43 & 45.
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apply a rigid test of similarity.97 Nor need the judge, by some unde-
fined standard, rule as a matter of law that on its face the evidence of
the prior accident is not similar enough to be admissible98 and thus risk
reversal for a possible abuse of discretion.99 The balancing test estab-
lished by the Federal Rules of Evidence permits the judge to consider
the factors of need and prejudice; similarity is merely an ingredient in
the relevancy test.
C. Prior Accident Evidence to Prove Dangerous Conditions
When a plaintiff offers prior accident evidence to show the danger of
the situation at the time of the accident, numerous courts have held
that they must strictly apply the requirement of similarity of condi-
tions."° This type of evidence, however, may most convincingly
demonstrate that a hazardous situation caused the plaintiffs acci-
dent.'' If the trial judge follows the inclusionary approach, the simi-
larity issue would constitute merely one factor in the test for
admissibility. If the court finds the evidence of the prior accident rele-
vant, only considerations of prejudice, confusion or waste of time as set
out in rule 403 should warrant its exclusion.10 2
97. See generally Aronson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Modelfor Improved Evidentiary
Decisionmaking in Washington, 54 WASH. L. REV. 31 (1978); Froncek, Proof ofPrior Act Evidence,
49 U. CtN. L. REV. 613 (1980); Green, Relevancy and Its Limits, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORD. 533
(1969); Schmerty, Impact of Federal Rules of Evidence on the Trial of a Products Case, 13 TRIAL
LAW. Q. 8 (1980).
98. See Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334 modofed, 620 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981), in which the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling that
the offered prior accident evidence was inadmissible. The court stated:
[We hold that the evidence ... was relevant and. . . sufficiently similar to be admit-
ted. The trial court generally has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, but that
discretion does not sanction exclusion of competent evidence without a sound, practical
reason. The probative value . . . also was not outweighed by the possibility of unfair
prejudice to the appellees.
Id at 340. See also Uitts v. General Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Holbrook
v. Koehring Co., 75 Mich. App. 592, 255 N.W.2d 698 (1977); Narring v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 59
Mich. App. 717, 229 N.W.2d 901 (Mich. 1975).
99. See Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 340 modied, 620 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
100. See, e.g., Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., Inc., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973); Uitts v. General
Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Holbrook v. Koehring Co., 75 Mich. App. 592,
255 N.W.2d 698 (1977); Narring v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 59 Mich. App. 717, 229 N.W.2d 901
(1975); Fowler v. S-H-S Motor Sales Corp., 560 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. 1977); Caldwell v. Yamaha
Motor Co. Ltd., 648 P.2d 519 (Wyo. 1982).
101. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 200, at 474.
102. See supra notes 65 & 72 and accompanying text.
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D. Prior Accident Evidence to Prove Knowledge
If a plaintiff offered evidence of a prior accident to show that the
defendant knew of the danger leading to the plaintiffs accident, had
constructive notice of the danger, or should have known of the danger,
courts traditionally relaxed the similarity requirement and relied on the
relevancy of the proffered evidence. If knowledge is the issue, rele-
vancy remains the test. 0 3 Therefore, the inclusionary and exclusionary
approaches are in harmony regarding evidence offered to show
knowledge."°
E. Prior Accident Evidence to Rebut Impossibility
Should the defendant claim that the plaintiffs theory of causation is
impossible, courts adhering to the traditional view allow the plaintiff to
present evidence of other similar happenings to rebut the claim of im-
possibility." 5 The inclusionary approach would admit evidence of a
product defect if such evidence passed the rule 404(b) and rule 403 tests
for admissibility." ° If the prior product and accident, and the plain-
tiff's product and accident, are not identical, the defendant should be
allowed to establish the degree of dissimilarity. The jury should con-
sider this dissimilarity and weigh the plaintiff's evidence accordingly.
Courts which automatically bar relevant evidence on the basis of dis-
similarity usurp the jury function. 10 7
103. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. See also Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v.
Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 89 (D.S.C. 1979); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73
F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976); Rayner v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 120 Ariz. 328, 585 P.2d 1240 (1978);
Fowler v. S-H-S Motor Sales Corp., 560 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. 1977).
104. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973); Rucker v. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co., 64 I11. App. 3d 770, 381 N.E.2d 715 (1978); Steinberg v. Ford Motor Co., 72 Mich. App.
520, 250 N.W.2d 115 (1976); Soper v. Enid Hotel Co., 383 P.2d 7 (Okla. 1963); Auzene v. Gulf
Pub. Serv. Co., 118 So. 513 (La. App. 1939); Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Glass, 107 S.W.2d 924 (rex. Civ.
App. 1937); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 76.
107. Balancing the dangers of the plaintiffs evidence against its probative value is the trial
judge's proper function. Mechanically excluding evidence because it fails a similarity test is an
improper function for the trial judge if he is not the sole fact finder. See supra note 93. Weighing
the evidence is a jury function. If the goal of a trial is to seek the "truth" for a fair and just
resolution of the dispute, courts should utilize the inclusionary approach to admissibility of safety
history evidence in product liability cases. The exclusionary approach keeps relevant evidence
from the fact finder, which interferes with the trial court's ability to render a fully informed deci-
sion on the merits of the case. See generally Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character
[Vol. 61:799
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IV. CONCLUSION
The majority of courts interpreting rule 404(b) correctly adopt the
inclusionary theory of admissibility. This interpretation radically alters
the common law standards of admissibility of prior accident evidence
in product liability litigation. The common law similarity standards
must be supplanted by the two-prong test of logical and legal relevance
inherent in the rule 404(b) and rule 403 tests for admissibility. '
The inclusionary test renders similarity merely a factor to be
weighed in the balancing test rather than an absolute requirement
under the traditional approach."° The inclusionary approach still al-
lows the trial judge to retain discretion and to control the litigation to
prevent prejudice.' 0 Because the primary goal of judicial administra-
tion is to render consistent judgments based upon relevant evidence
which is not unfairly prejudicial, all courts should follow the inclusion-
ary approach to admissibility under rule 404(b).
Gail A. Randall
ofSpecific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA L. REv. 777 (1981); Stone, supra note 1. See also supra note 93
and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 74 & 76.
109. See supra notes 92 & 93.
110. See supra note 93.
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